Commentary for Bava Kamma 178:14
ואי בעית אימא אידי ואידי לאחר תקנה ואית להו תקנת אושא אלא למאן דאמר לאשה ולא לאיש מאי טעמא כדרבא דאמר רבא
but not if assaulted by the husband,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who has in them but the right of usufruct. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> whereas another [Baraitha] teaches that [they are not to go out free] when assaulted either by the husband or by the wife. Now it was thought that all authorities agree that a right to usufruct does not constitute in law a right to the very substance. Are we not to suppose then that the point at issue between them was that the one who held that they are to go out free if assaulted by the wife did not accept the enactment of Usha, while the one who held that they are not to go out free when assaulted either by the husband or by the wife accepted the enactment of Usha?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to which the wife would not be able to impair the right of the husband, [nor would the husband on the other hand be able to impair the right of the wife to the slaves whose substance is actually hers.] ');"><sup>14</sup></span> — No; it is quite certain that the enactment of Usha was unanimously accepted, but the former Baraitha was formulated before the passing of the enactment while the other one was formulated after. Or if you like I may say that both the one Baraitha and the other dealt with conditions prevailing after the enactment, and also that both accepted the enactment of Usha, but the authority who held that the slaves are to go out free if assaulted by the wife and not by the husband did so on account of a reason underlying a statement of Raba, for Raba said:
Explore commentary for Bava Kamma 178:14. In-depth commentary and analysis from classical Jewish sources.